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Abstract 
The growing incidence of misuse of the non-profit organizations (NPOs) by terrorists around the world has lead to a concerted 
effort globally to protect these organizations. Specifically, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued Special 
Recommendation (SR) VIII to assist member countries in assessing the adequacy of their current laws and regulations relating to 
NPOs. This paper provides a review of the evaluation reports on various member countries. The overall review contributes to the 
literature on terrorist abuse of NPOs and concurrently facilitates effective policy implementation by member countries. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Money laundering is one of the biggest obstacles in maintaining an effective international financial system. 
Globally, it can results in significant costs on the world economy by damaging the effective operations of national 
economies and promoting weak economic policies. As a result, financial markets become corrupted and the public’s 
confidence in the international financial system is eroded. Eventually, as financial markets become increasingly risky 
and less stable, the rate of growth of the world economy is reduced. 
Money laundering is the conversion of illegal income into assets. Money laundering is a financial crime involving 
a series of complex transactions and numerous financial institutions across many foreign jurisdictions. Such 
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characteristics increase the difficulties to investigate and prosecute the parties involved (Buchanan, 2004).  
Money laundering involves 3 processes: placement, layering and integration. Fig. 1 presents the money laundering 
process. Process 1, placement is where the cash is placed into the financial system or retail economy or are smuggled 
out of the country. The aims of the launderer are to remove the cash from the location of acquisition so as to avoid 
detection from the authorities and to then transform it into other forms of asset (Buchanan, 2004). Process 2, layering 
is where concealment or disguise of the source of the ownership of the funds is done by creating complex layers of 
financial transactions designed to disguise the audit trail and provide anonymity. The purpose of this process is to 
disassociate the illegal cash from the source of the crime by purposely creating a complex web of financial 
transactions aimed at concealing any audit trail as well as the source and ownership of funds (Buchanan, 2004). The 
final process, process 3 is the integration, where the money is integrated into the legitimate economic and financial 
system and is assimilated with all the other assets in the system. Integration of the "cleaned" money into the economy 
is accomplished by the launderer making it appear to have been legally earned. At this stage, it is extremely difficult 
to distinguish between legal and illegal wealth (Buchanan, 2004).  
 
     Fig. 1. Money laundering process 
An example of money laundering process is extracted from the IRS website (IRS, 2013). On July 9, 2013, in 
Oklahoma City, Okla., Johnnie Ray Bragg Jr. was sentenced to 480 months in prison, four years of supervised release 
and ordered to forfeit $260,752. Bragg pleaded guilty in August 2012 to drug and money laundering conspiracies.  
According to court documents, between September 21, 2010 to April 20, 2011, Bragg and others received payments 
from the sale of narcotics and deposited the proceeds into bank accounts at branches of a bank in Oklahoma, which 
were controlled by others in the conspiracy. Bragg and others also wired transferred drug proceeds from Oklahoma to 
California and purchased “money packs” that were then used to load funds from the drug proceeds onto Bragg’s 
prepaid Visa card. Bragg used the Visa card to pay for his travel between Oklahoma and California in furtherance of 
the drug-trafficking conspiracy. 
In the context of money laundering and terrorism financing, the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States 
(USA) initiated a global recognition of such fundings through legitimate NPOs. Following this incident, Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) had implemented the Special Recommendation VIII specifically for NPOs to prevent the 
misuse of this sector for terrorist financing. In addition to FATF, other organizations have also been set up to 
undertake functions for development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money 
laundering and financial terrorism. Such organizations include the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), 
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) (for Asian Countries), Council of Europe Group (PC-R-EV), The 
Eastern and Southern African Anti Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), South American Anti Money 
Laundering Group (GAFISUD) and Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). 
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2. Literature Review 
Financial markets have been directly and indirectly affected by terrorist attacks. Attacks of September 11, 2001 in 
the USA gave a huge impact to the world where terrorist had shaken the stability of the USA and international 
financial system. The attacks had been claimed to be funded through legitimate NPOs. NPOs are generally defined as 
associations, charities, and other voluntary organizations formed to meet cultural, religious or public service 
objectives (Bottiglieri, Kroleski and Conway, 2011). These organizations are supported by public donations as well 
as from other revenue generating activities such as obtaining grants from funders, contracting with government to 
provide services and charging for services rendered. It is reasonable for the donors to expect that the NPOs to be 
trustworthy in handling the funds they receive and also in the use of these funds (Arshad, Abu Bakar, Thani and 
Omar, 2012).  
One main issue in NPO is transparency. Transparency is vital as it reduces information asymmetries between 
NPOs and their stakeholders. Transparency is not only limited to the publication of information in the annual reports 
but also information regarding the governance practices of the NPOs. In this context, governance practices refer to 
compliance with regulatory requirements and recommendations in line with its public service objectives and also 
provide accurate, complete and informative information in the annual reports (Behn, DeVries and Lin, 2010). 
However, the information reported by the NPOs can be insufficient or misrepresented for effective monitoring of their 
activities as NPOs are generally subjected to less stringent regulatory requirements. Consistent with this argument, 
Burger and Owen (2010) find that many NPOs failed to provide information or provide inaccurate information. In 
addition, there is also lack of empirical evidence regarding the factors that influence the extent of disclosure and 
reporting practices of NPO, particularly in developing countries (Atan, Zainon and Wah, 2012; Othman and Ali, 
2012). 
The less stringent regulatory requirements in the non-profit sector provides opportunity for criminals to use this 
institution to cover their illegal activities. Consistent with this, Sullivan (2008) states that lack in monitoring of 
financial activities; light due diligence, poor customer identification rules, and the absence of mandated forms or 
reports contributes to various illegal activities. In addition, some believe that the anonymity provided by NPO 
regulations also complement illicit activities. These characteristics infer that NPOs are susceptible to various abuses 
by the terrorists.   
In mitigating these abuses, FATF had outlined a Special Recommendation (SR) VIII specifically for NPOs. One 
important recommendation is the promotion of transparency. This is to enhance confidence and trust in the sector as 
well as the general public. In achieving transparency, four elements are suggested to all member countries: (1) 
outreach to the non-profit sector regarding terrorist financing issues, (2) supervision or monitoring of the non-profit 
sector, (3) effective information gathering and investigation and (4) effective capacity to respond to international 
requests for information about NPOs of concern. Assessment on the implementation of these recommendations are 
carried out by FATF peers. This study reviews these evaluation reports. 
3. Research Methodology 
This study reviews the mutual evaluation reports on the extent of compliance of SR VII. SR VII is part of the 
FATF calls to member countries to review the adequacy of their laws and regulations relating to NPOs as part of the 
overall strategy to protect NPOs from the abuse of terrorists. The reviews are done on 40 member countries. The list 
of countries is as per Table 1. 
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   Table 1.List of countries 
 
No. Country 
1 Afghanistan 
2 Australia 
3 Bangladesh 
4 Brunei Darussalam 
5 Cambodia 
6 Canada 
7 China, People’s Republic 
8 Cook Islands 
9 Fiji 
10 Hong Kong 
11 India 
12 Indonesia 
13 Japan 
14 Korea 
15 Lao PDR 
16 Macau, China 
17 Malaysia 
18 Maldives 
19 Marshall Islands 
20 Mongolia 
21 Myanmar 
22 Nauru 
23 Nepal 
24 New Zealand 
25 Niue 
26 Pakistan 
27 Palau 
28 Papua New Guinea 
29 Philippines 
30 Samoa 
31 Singapore 
32 Solomon Islands 
33 Sri Lanka 
34 Taipei 
35 Thailand 
36 Timor-Leste 
37 Tonga 
38 USA 
39 Vanuatu 
40 Vietnam 
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4. Findings and Discussion 
4.1 Review of Evaluation Reports 
• Afghanistan 
Afghanistan received non-compliant rating with regards to SR VIII. The Law of Combating the Financing 
Terrorism (CFT LD) (legislative decree) and NPO decree and the Law on Social Organization still lack Parliamentary 
approval. In addition, there is also lack of effectiveness due to the fact that the rule of law is not upheld in the entirety 
by the Afghan territory. Authorities have also not undertaken a review on the adequacy of the current laws and 
decrees for CFT purposes as well as risk assessment of the sector. No outreach programmes have been undertaken by 
the authorities to the sector to raise awareness of the risk of terrorist financing.  
In terms of the monitoring and supervision of the sector, the authorities do not focus on the NPOs which account 
for the significant portion of the financial resources of the sector. In addition, record keeping requirements are only 
applied with respect to donations and gifts of a level prescribed by the Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB), not the entirety 
of the organization’s activities while information on the activities and identities of the persons who own, control or 
direct the activities of the organization is not publicly available through the appropriate authorities. It is unclear that 
the appropriate authorities have been able to register and monitor the activities of a significant portion of the sector. 
There are lack of sufficient and adequate investigative expertise and capacity at the Ministry of Economy (MOE) for 
the investigation and examination of NPOs that are either suspected or are being exploited by terrorist financiers.  
• Australia 
Australia received partial compliant rating with regards to SR VIII. Australia has reviewed its laws on NPOs and 
the non-profit sector. However, the reviews did not result in the implementation of any specific measures. Measures 
with regards to charities and fundraising for overseas causes are subject to stricter scrutiny through Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO) than the non-profit sector as a whole, which is more broadly regulated by State and Territory 
laws. It is not clear that Australia has adequately implemented measures across the non-profit sector to ensure that 
NPOs associated with terrorists cannot pose as legitimate NPOs, or that funds or other assets collected or transferred 
by NPOs are not diverted to support the activities of terrorists and terrorist organizations. 
• Bangladesh 
Bangladesh received partial compliant rating with regards to SR VIII. Bangladesh did not have an overall strategy 
to identify and address AML/CTF risks within the non-profit sector. There were limited awareness programmes on 
CFT risks by the authorities. In addition, the supervision of NPOs is inadequate and compliance with registration and 
financial reporting obligations is very low and a significant portion of the non-profit sector still remains outside the 
formal regulation and supervision. 
• Brunei Darussalam 
Brunei received partial compliant rating with regards to SR VIII. Brunei lacks review of the sector’s potential 
vulnerabilities to terrorist financing. In addition, monitoring of the sector and outreach programmes to NPOs were 
also lacking with regards to specific vulnerabilities. There are no clear obligations for record keeping by societies. 
• Cambodia 
Cambodia received partial compliant rating with regards to SR VIII. There is no domestic review on the rules and 
regulations for NPOs and no outreach programmes to the NPOs. There are also no formal channels for international 
cooperation. 
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• Canada 
Canada received largely compliant rating with regards to SR VIII. Canada has taken considerable steps to 
implement SR VIII in relation to registered charities, which is considered to be the most risky sector, based on the risk 
assessment studies it has done. A large segment of the NPOs population is not covered by the current measures using 
the risk based approach. The existing coordination mechanisms between competent authorities especially between the 
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and the parties who are responsible for listing and freezing applications is lacking in 
addressing the risk in some segments of the NPO sector.  
• People’s Republic of China 
China received largely compliant rating with regards to SR VIII. China has a very robust and deep reaching system 
for the oversight of NPOs. It was found that there was no outreach programmes to the NPOs with a view to protect 
the sector specifically from terrorism financing abuse. Meanwhile, in terms of supervision and oversight of the NPO 
sector, China was not expressly focused on reviewing the sector’s potential vulnerabilities to terrorist activities or on 
discovering and preventing possible threats of misuse of the sector by terrorist financiers. 
• Cook Islands 
Cook Islands received partially compliant rating with regards to SR VIII. The risk of terrorism financing and 
money laundering through the NPO sector in the Cook Islands was very low and there was no evidence to suggest 
that any NPO in the Cook Islands had been used as a vehicle for terrorism financing and money laundering. There 
was no outreach to the NPO sector with a view to protect the sector specifically from terrorism financing abuse. 
Supervision and oversight of the NPO sector was not expressly focused on reviewing the sector’s potential 
vulnerabilities to terrorist activities or on discovering and preventing possible threats of misuse of the sector by 
terrorist financiers. A review of the NPO sector had been conducted but significant information gaps remained on the 
size and activities of the sector. There was limited supervision or monitoring of NPOs and weak implementation of 
the existing requirements for incorporated societies to report constitutional, programmatic or financial information. 
Meanwhile, registration requirements did not include obligations to record the details of persons who own, control or 
direct NPOs. On the other hand, sanctions were only available to competent authorities for breaches of controls over 
NPOs are ineffective. 
• Fiji 
Fiji received partially compliant rating with regards to  SR VIII. The authorities in Fiji are currently conducting a 
review of the nonprofit sector. The objective of the review is to implement an overall revision of the laws governing 
the sector. However, Fiji has not yet introduced measures to prevent the abuse of the nonprofit sector by terrorist 
organizations as well as the measures to monitor the disposition of funds by NPO. Thus, in reaching this rating the 
assessors’ tool into account the priority attached to the review currently underway. 
• Hong Kong 
Hong Kong received largely compliant for compliance with SR VIII. Hong Kong has taken a number of important 
steps regarding its NPO sector, particularly in view of the finding of the recent domestic review that the sector is of 
relatively low risk of misuse for terrorism financing. Conducting the domestic review was an important step which 
provided useful information on the characteristics and scope of the NPO sector. While a domestic review has recently 
been completed, and various statistics are kept by relevant authorities, there remain some information gaps in relation 
to the size and financial scope of the NPO sector in Hong Kong. The outreach has recently commenced to the NPO 
sector but it is too early to fully judge the effectiveness. In terms of the requirements to identify persons who own, 
control or direct the activities of NPOs differ depending on the legal form of the NPO and, for NPOs established as 
companies (the majority of NPOs), are not fully satisfactory, even allowing for the lower level of risk. The 
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requirement to maintain documents for at least five years is not met for NPOs other than those established as 
companies under the CO. 
• India 
India received noncompliant rating with regards to SR VIII. There was no review undertaken on the adequacy of 
domestic laws in the non-profit sector and there was no periodic reassessments undertaken by reviewing new 
information on the sector’s potential vulnerabilities to terrorist activities. Besides that, there was no outreach to the 
non-profit sector with a view to protecting the sector from abuse for terrorist financing takes place. There was only 
limited information available on the identity of person(s) who own, control or direct their activities, including senior 
officers, board members and trustees. India had not demonstrated measures to sanction violations of oversight 
measures or rules by NPOs or persons acting on behalf of NPOs for NPOs other than those registered under the 
Income Tax Act and under the FCRA. The majority of NPOs did not register as such with government agencies, 
including the tax authorities. 
• Indonesia 
Indonesia received noncompliant for compliance with Special Recommendation VIII. Indonesia has not yet 
undertaken a review of its domestic NPO sector. There was no ongoing strategy to identify and mitigate significant 
terrorism financing risks within Indonesia’s non-profit sector. There was limited outreach to the NPO sector or focus 
on CFT risks by the non-profit sector authorities. There were weak transparency and governance available on the 
NPO sector as a whole and very weak implementation of the existing legal regime on reporting of constitutional, 
programmatic or financial information. Indonesia lacked capacity to examine those NPOs that were suspected of 
either being exploited by or actively supporting terrorist activity or terrorist organizations and have inadequate 
mechanisms for information exchange with foreign counterparts. 
• Japan 
Japan received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII.  There was no outreach to the non-profit 
sector on terrorism financing risks and preventative measures in the sector. There were some impediments to police 
having timely access to relevant taxation records of NPOs that receive preferential tax treatment. Meanwhile, social 
welfare juridical persons were not required to update changes in their office holders in a timely fashion. 
• Korea 
Korea received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. There was no outreach has been 
undertaken to the NPO sector on terrorist financing risks and preventative measures. There was also no domestic 
coordination or information sharing among NPO supervisory authorities or between these authorities and other 
government agencies, including law enforcement. Points of contact had not been identified to respond to international 
requests for information regarding NPOs. 
• Lao PDR 
Lao received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. The supervisory framework for both 
international and domestic NPOs was at a nascent stage, especially so for domestic NPOs. There was no outreach to 
the sector on AML/CFT. On the other hand, registration requirements did not include obligations to record the details 
of person who own, control or direct NPOs, irrespective of whether the person is an officer of the NPO. The report 
keeping obligations were not clear and did not extend beyond 5 years. There were lacking in terms of monitoring due 
to staffing constraints. The laws to enhance regulation of NPO sector were relatively new and the effectiveness was 
difficult to demonstrate and assess. 
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• Macau, China 
Macau received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. A full review of the NPO sector and the 
risk of the sector to financial terrorism have not been completed though a preliminary review has been undertaken. 
There was no formal supervision or monitoring of NPOs accounting for a significant portion of NPOs’ financial 
resources or a substantial share of the sector’s international activities and there has been no outreach to the NPO 
sector for AML/CFT purposes. 
• Malaysia 
Malaysia received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. There was no ongoing strategy to 
identify and mitigate AML/CFT risks within NPO sector. There was limited outreach to the NPO sector or focus on 
CFT risks by NPO sector authorities to date and inadequate mechanisms for information exchange with foreign 
counterparts. 
• Maldives 
Maldives received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. There was no overall strategy to 
identify and address AML/CFT risks within the NPO sector and no review of the domestic NPO sector. There was 
also no outreach to the NPO sector or raising awareness on financial terrorism risks or promotion of overall healthy 
NPO governance. Meanwhile, supervision of NPOs was inadequate and compliance with registration and financial 
reporting obligations was low and there was insufficient transparency of NPOs because the information maintained 
was insufficient. There was no ongoing updating and recording of information about those who control NPOs and the 
operation of these NPOs and no clear mechanisms to respond to international requests. 
• Marshall Islands 
Marshall Islands received noncompliant with Special Recommendation VIII. This country failed to review NPO 
sector in full and there was no outreach undertaken on financial terrorism risks. The authorities were lacking in 
monitoring of the NPOs and there was also lacked of NPO transparency requirements and available sanctions as well 
as lacked in record keeping requirements. The registration requirements were still not fit and properly tested.  
• Mongolia 
Mongolia received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. From the report, Mongolia has no 
domestic NPO sector review and no outreach to the said sector on AML/CFT. Under the registration requirements, it 
did not include obligations to record the person who own, control or direct the NPOs. In terms of sanctions, it was 
considered ineffective where it was only available to competent authorities in the cases of breaches of controls over 
NPOs. 
 
• Myanmar 
Myanmar received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. From the report, the sector and its 
related laws and regulations have not been reviewed to check terrorism financing vulnerabilities. There was no 
comprehensive outreach to NPO sector and there were no requirements to maintain records for 5 years. 
• Nauru 
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Nauru received noncompliant with Special Recommendation VIII. From the report, it was stated that there was no 
legal framework to support the formation or operation of NPOs in Nauru and no aspect of SRVIII has yet been 
implemented in Nauru. 
• Nepal 
Nepal received noncompliant with Special Recommendation VIII. Nepal’s NPO sector was poorly organized, 
monitored and supervised. While Nepal officials indicated that they believed terrorism financing risk in the NPO 
sector is small, it was difficult to understand how they could maintain this confidence in light of the fact that they 
were unable to state the size, wealth and activities of the majority of NPOs operated in Nepal. There was no review 
undertaken on the adequacy of the domestic laws in the non-profit sector and no periodic reassessments undertaken 
by reviewing new information on the sector’s potential vulnerabilities to terrorist activities. There was no outreach to 
the non-profit sector with a view to protecting the sector from terrorism financing abuse and there was limited 
information available on the identity of person(s) who own, control or direct their activities, including senior officers, 
board members and trustees. Nepal had not demonstrated that measures were in place to sanction violations of 
oversight measures or rules by NPOs or persons acting on behalf of NPOs for NPOs other than those registered under 
the Income Tax Act. While all NPOs must be registered under the Association Registrations Act, it is acknowledged 
that not all are registered and the enforcement action against noncompliant NPOs had not occurred. 
• New Zealand 
New Zealand received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. The Charities Commission has the 
legal powers and institutional capacity to meet the requirements of SRVIII in relation to that portion of the NPO 
sector which are registered charities. The Commission is establishing its credentials as the primary regulatory and 
supervisory authority for the charitable sector. Its Register of Charities contains significant information on the sector. 
However, there was no review and no outreach of the NPO sector to identify financial terrorism risk and 
vulnerabilities. Besides that, there was limited information on controlling minds behind NPOs as well as limited 
monitoring by the Companies Office or Charities Commission. Meanwhile, the record keeping obligations were not 
comprehensive. 
• Niue 
Niue received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. From the report, it is stated that there is no 
review of the domestic NPO sector has been undertaken and no outreach or awareness rising to NPOs on the risks of 
terrorism financing and available measures to protect the sector. In addition, there was no outreach or awareness 
rising to NPOs promoting transparency, accountability, integrity, and public confidence in the administration and 
management of NPOs and no monitoring of the NPO sector, including enforcement of annual reporting obligations 
for registered NPOs and employment of available sanctions for not complying with societies. Niue also did not have 
mandatory registration or licensing for all NPOs and they did not have a specified period for registered societies to 
keep the full records of their administration and management, including financial and programmatic information. 
 
• Pakistan 
Pakistan received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. From the report, the NPO sector 
assessment did not include assessment of ML/TF risks to the sector and no ML/TF risk assessment has been 
conducted of the sector. Their efforts are lacking in terms of raising the awareness with regards to the risk of money 
laundering and terrorism financing. There was no effective monitoring or supervision of the NPOs that account for a 
significant portion of the financial resources of the sector and its international activities and the powers of the 
registration authorities to sanction violations of the regulations of the sector are very limited. The NPOs were not 
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required to keep records of transactions or to document their donors and beneficiaries. The information sharing 
amongst competent authorities was hampered by the fragmentation of the registration system, lack of enforcement 
and lack of computerization and a large segment of the NPO sector remains informal, i.e., neither registered nor 
licensed. 
• Palau 
Palau received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. From the report, it is stated that there is no 
review of laws or the NPO sector and no proper test for NPO registration. Besides that, audit statements were not 
required in NPOs sector. The country also lacked in terms of monitoring and supervision of the non-profit sector. 
There was also neither outreach nor awareness raising, as well as no designated contact point. 
• Papua New Guinea 
Papua New Guinea received noncompliant with Special Recommendation VIII. From the report, it was found that 
there was no effective registration of NPOs and also no review of the adequacy of existing laws and regulations that 
relate to NPO that could be abused for financial terrorism. In terms of monitoring mechanism, it was found that the 
country lacked in supervision of the registration of NPOs and also failed to monitor the sources of funds for NPOs. 
Besides that, there were no proper measures in place to sanction violations of oversight rules by NPOs as well as there 
was no outreach or awareness rising. 
• Philippines 
Philippines received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. It is stated in the report that not all 
NPOs are licensed or registered in the country. While a comprehensive review of the NPO sector was recently 
completed, a specific assessment of the risk of NPOs to terrorism financing had not been conducted. The authorities 
did not have sufficient data to identify NPOs which account for a significant portion of the financial resources under 
control of the sector; and a substantial share of the sector’s international activities. There was also insufficient 
resources in NPO regulatory bodies as well as gaps in information held in NPOs. 
• Samoa 
Samoa received noncompliant with Special Recommendation VIII. Samoa had not reviewed the adequacy of its 
laws and regulations relating to NPOs that could be abused for the financing of terrorism. NPOs in Samoa were not 
involved in Samoa’s AML/CFT regime and were subject to minimal supervision and monitoring. 
• Singapore 
Singapore received largely compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. In Singapore, a central registration 
system exists under the Charities Act for the NPO sector in Singapore. The Commissioner of Charities, with six 
government Sector Administrators to coordinate information, was an efficient and well structured system for 
oversight of this sector. Violations of obligations may be sanctioned by the Commissioner. The Commissioner’s 
Annual Reports published on the web site of the Commissioner indicate that such action is in fact taken for a variety 
of reasons. However, Singapore is lacking in terms of conducting a terrorism financing vulnerability review of the 
non-profit sector. 
• Solomon Islands 
Solomon Islands received noncompliant with Special Recommendation VIII. In the report, Solomon Islands had 
not review the adequacy of existing laws and regulations related to NPOs that could be abused for financial terrorism. 
Besides that, there was no effective registration of NPOs in terms of who control the NPO and there was no 
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appropriate effective monitoring mechanism for NPOs including the registration of NPOs and the ability to monitor 
sources of funds for NPOs. The sanctions were not discussive and proportionate and they lacked in terms of 
monitoring or supervision as well as no awareness on terrorism financing. 
• Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. Sri Lanka is conducting a 
comprehensive review of its NGO legislative framework. However, the review is not focused on terrorist financing. 
There has been no assessment of the overall vulnerabilities of the NPO sector to terrorist financing or other abuse. 
There is insufficient monitoring of NPOs to ensure funds are used to achieve charitable objectives.  There are no 
requirements to ensure the financial transparency of the NPO sector and there has been no education to NPOs on how 
to protect themselves from terrorist financing and other abuses. There is no specific guidance issued to financial 
institutions in respect of customers that are NPOs. 
• Taipei 
Taipei received largely compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. Taipei is only lacking in terms of raising 
the awareness of specific vulnerabilities in the NPO sector in relation to specific of terrorist abuse. 
• Thailand 
Thailand received noncompliant with Special Recommendation VIII. Thailand has not yet undertaken a review of 
the adequacy of existing laws and regulations that relate to NPO that can be abused for the financing of terrorism. No 
outreach has been undertaken with the NPO sector with a view to protect the sector from terrorism financing abuse. 
Besides that, the authorities could not demonstrate that they have taken effective steps to promote supervision and 
monitoring of those NPOs which account for a significant portion of the financial resources under the control of the 
sector.  In Thailand, NPOs are not required to maintain and make available to appropriate authorities records of 
domestic and international transactions that are sufficiently detailed to verify that funds have been spent in a manner 
consistent with the purpose and objectives of the organization. While legal authority may exist to investigate the 
affairs of NPOs, there are no effective mechanisms in place to ensure domestic cooperation, coordination, or 
information sharing. There are no contacts points have been identified for dealing with international requests for 
information about NPOs. The authorities did not demonstrate that the measures in place were sufficient to mitigate 
the potential terrorism risks in Thailand via the NPO sector. 
 
 
 
• Timor-Leste 
Timor-Leste received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. Based on the information available 
to the Evaluation Team, it appears that the risk of financial terrorism and money laundering through the NPO sector is 
low and there is no evidence to suggest that any NPO in Timor-Leste has been used as a vehicle for financial 
terrorism and money laundering. However, no review has been undertaken of the adequacy of existing laws and 
regulations that relate to NPOs that can be abused for the financing of terrorism or of the financial terrorism and 
money laundering risks to the sector. Moreover, no outreach has been undertaken with the NPO sector with a view to 
protecting the sector from FT abuse. The authorities have not taken effective steps to promote supervision and 
monitoring of those NPOs which account for a significant portion of the financial resources under the control of the 
sector. In this country, NPOs are not required to maintain and make available to appropriate authorities, records of 
domestic and international transactions that are sufficiently detailed to verify that funds have been spent in a manner 
consistent with the purpose and objectives of the organization. Besides that, there are no effective mechanisms in 
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place to ensure domestic cooperation, coordination or information sharing and no contact points have been identified 
for dealing with international requests for information about NPOs. 
• Tonga 
Tonga received noncompliant with Special Recommendation VIII. Based on the evaluation report, it is likely that 
the risk of financial terrorism and money laundering through the NPO sector is very low and there is no evidence to 
suggest that any NPO in Tonga has been used as a vehicle for financial terrorism or money laundering. However, 
Tonga has not undertaken a review of the adequacy of existing laws and regulations that relate to NPO that can be 
abused for the financing of terrorism. No outreach has been undertaken with the NPO sector with a view to protect the 
sector from TF abuse. The authorities have not taken effective steps to promote supervision and monitoring of those 
NPOs which account for a significant portion of the financial resources under the control of the sector. In this country, 
NPOs are not required to maintain and make available to appropriate authorities, records of domestic and 
international transactions that are sufficiently detailed to verify that funds have been spent in a manner consistent with 
the purpose and objectives of the organization. While legal authority may exist to investigate the affairs of NPOs 
there are no effective mechanisms in place to ensure domestic cooperation, coordination or information sharing and 
there is no contact points have been identified for dealing with international requests for information about NPOs. 
• USA 
USA received full compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. Overall, the measures which are being 
implemented to ensure that the NPO sector cannot be abused by terrorists or terrorist financiers are working 
effectively. U.S. authorities at both state and federal level take action against illegitimate or fraudulent charities 
particularly where they are able to demonstrate that these charities have been established to facilitate terrorist 
financing. USA has taken many steps to improve oversight of NPOs as discussed above. USA should continue to 
devote resources in order to prevent the abuse of this sector from terrorist organizations, including ensuring the 
effective flow of information between competent authorities. Federal cooperation and information sharing with 
NASCO officials has yielded enhanced communication, a greater understanding of federal policies on the part of state 
officials, and increased outreach to the NPO sector through state officials. 
• Vanuatu 
Vanuatu received noncompliant with Special Recommendation VIII. There has been no review of the adequacy of 
laws and regulations relating to supervision of NPOs in this country. There is also lack of effective implementation of 
laws and regulations regarding NPOs and the authorities fail to provide AML/CFT guidance regarding NPOs to 
financial institutions. 
 
• Vietnam 
Vietnam received partially compliant with Special Recommendation VIII. Vietnam has a comprehensive set of 
procedures for the licensing of the domestic and international NPOs. However, a lack of supervision and outreach to 
the NPO sector can pave the ground for potential abuse of NPOs, by criminal elements including money launderers 
and terrorist organizations. In addition, lack of coordination among various agencies on the activities of the NPO can 
possibly serve as another threat to the reputation of the NPO sector. There is also lacking in terms of NPO 
transparency requirements. There is no systematic outreach programs no formal channel for international cooperation. 
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 Table 2.Summary of special recommendation VIII for each country 
No. Country Rating 
1 Afghanistan Noncompliant 
2 Australia Partially Compliant 
3 Bangladesh Partially Compliant 
4 Brunei Darussalam Partially Compliant 
5 Cambodia Partially Compliant 
6 Canada Largely Compliant 
7 China, People’s Republic Largely Compliant 
8 Cook Islands Partially Compliant 
9 Fiji Partially Compliant 
10 Hong Kong Largely Compliant 
11 India Noncompliant 
12 Indonesia Noncompliant 
13 Japan Partially Compliant 
14 Korea Partially Compliant 
15 Lao PDR Partially Compliant 
16 Macau, China Partially Compliant 
17 Malaysia Partially Compliant 
18 Maldives Noncompliant 
19 Marshall Islands Noncompliant 
20 Mongolia Partially Compliant 
21 Myanmar Partially Compliant 
22 Nauru Noncompliant 
23 Nepal Noncompliant 
24 New Zealand Partially Compliant 
25 Niue Partially Compliant 
26 Pakistan Partially Compliant 
27 Palau Partially Compliant 
28 Papua New Guinea Noncompliant 
29 Philippines Partially Compliant 
30 Samoa Noncompliant 
31 Singapore Largely Compliant 
32 Solomon Islands Noncompliant 
33 Sri Lanka Partially Compliant 
34 Taipei Largely Compliant 
35 Thailand Noncompliant 
36 Timor-Leste Partially Compliant 
37 Tonga Noncompliant 
38 USA Compliant 
39 Vanuatu Noncompliant 
40 Vietnam Partially Compliant 
224   Normah Omar et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  145 ( 2014 )  211 – 225 
4.2 Discussion  
Out of 40 member countries, only 1 country received full compliant based on the review of the evaluation reports, 
which is the USA. The review indicates that USA had fully observed and implemented the recommendations. The 
International Committee on Fundraising Organizations (ICFO) had published the results of a comparative survey of 
ICFO members and their countries which included USA in relation to the IRS requirements to file Form 990. ICFO 
stated that due to the high volume, only those organizations which are exposed by media or subject to numerous 
complaints get investigated. However, state monitoring agencies have limited resources to monitor so many 
organizations thus the result is lightly regulated. USA should find additional resources to enhance and maintain the 
regulations that govern their NPO in order to avoid history September 11 from occurring. 
5 of the member countries received largely compliant from the review of the evaluation reports. This indicates that 
there was no outreach programmes undertaken to raise awareness of specific vulnerabilities in the non-profit sector in 
relation to specific risks of terrorist abuse. This is very crucial as the society might not know that the “angelic” 
institutions that they used to give charities might be involved in criminal act. This awareness is important in order to 
curb the occurrence of terrorism financing in their respective countries.  
21 of the member countries received partial compliant from the review of the evaluation reports. The review 
indicates that there is an incomplete review towards the laws and regulations for the NPOs. In addition, these 
countries are lacking in terms of monitoring and supervision of their NPOs. In the context of transparency, the NPOs 
were not required to maintain records of domestic and international transactions and there were also no systematic 
outreach programmes as well as no formal channel for international cooperation. While terrorism financing had not 
been detected in these countries, nevertheless the limitations within the rules and regulations that govern the NPOs 
could be a possibility that it may occur in the future. This may not only jeopardize the countries itself but the other 
countries that have business relationships with them as well. 
13 of the members countries received noncompliant from the review of the evaluation reports. Basically, these 
countries had not followed the recommendation suggested by FATF. They had not undertaken a review of the 
adequacy of existing laws and regulations that were related to NPOs. In terms of transparency, the authorities had not 
taken effective steps to promote supervision and monitoring of those NPOs which account for a significant portion of 
the financial resources under the control of the sector.  NPOs were not required to maintain and make available to 
appropriate authorities, records of domestic and international transactions that were sufficiently detailed to verify that 
funds had been spent in a manner consistent with the purpose and objectives of the organization.  
While legal authority may exist to investigate the affairs of NPOs that are not effective, coordination or 
information sharing and no contact points have been identified for dealing with international requests for information 
about NPOs. Some of these countries did not implement the SR VIII at all. The countries should be aware that the 
misuse of NPOs for the financing terrorism could bring harm to their countries. The SR VIII is not to suppress NPO 
activities but it is to curb the terrorist financing from occurring. In addition, these recommendations help the NPOs to 
function and operate more effectively. Fig. 2 presents the summary of compliant rating for 40 member countries. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Summary of compliant rating for 40 countries 
 
225 Normah Omar et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  145 ( 2014 )  211 – 225 
5. Conclusion 
In mitigating money laundering, the FATF proposed 40 Recommendations and SR VIII specifically focuses on 
NPOs. The review of the evaluation reports revealed that only the USA is fully complied with SR VII, 33% of the 
member countries did not comply and the remaining member countries are partially complied with SR VII.  These 
reviews highlight that a continuous and integrated efforts are required in protecting the NPOs from the risk of terrorist 
abuse. While the reviews provide useful information to member countries in improving their relevant policies, the 
information is only based on published data. The review in this study is limited to the evaluation reports published by 
the Asia Pacific Group. Invaluable insights can also be gained through in depth case studies of selected NPOs in 
various jurisdictions.  
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